DTIC ADA194173: American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II.

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AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
EASTERN FRONT OPERATIONS
IN WORLD WAR II

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AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON EASTERN FRONT OPERATIONS
IN WORLD WAR II

Colonel David M. Glantz
Soviet Army Studies Office
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

April 1987

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Introduction

One's view of historical reality is inevitably flawed . While most
historians strive to preserve or recreate an objective picture of historical
forces and events, a variety of factors affect their work all of which tend to
warp objective reality and produce a subjective view of history. This process
is inevitable, and it poses to the historian the principal challenge of his
profession, a challenge which he seldom totally overcomes.

One of the most potent factors affecting objectivity is that of parochi¬
alism — in its milder form simply limited perspective — a narrowness of view
produced by a natural concern for one's own history and reinforced by the
remoteness of events occurring in distant lands. Parochialism on the part of
historians also responds, in part, to demand — the demand of their reading
public who are parochial in their own right and who seek information

concerning their own past. Cultural and ideological differences that exist
between governments and peoples exacerbate this tendency. These differences
color the interpretation of events and tend to stifle understanding between
peoples already separated by space and time.

The availability of sources upon which to base historical accounts
contributes to the emergence of a parochial view. A historian must use what
sources are available to him, and if those sources are limited, so also will

his perspective be limited. Good historians will acknowledge those limita- >r

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tions as they reconstruct the events of the past. q

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A more extreme form of parachialism or limited perspective is bias, which _ _

can be either unintentional or intentional. Unintentional bias is a result of

the same forces that produce a parochial view. Intentional bias can be a * - "

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manisfestation of the historian's own internal beliefs or the product of
ideological or political influence on the historian from external
institutions, such as governments, religious bodies, or economic entities.
Bias, especially in the deliberate form, creates a more twisted, and hence
more harmful, view of historical events than simple parochialism. While
parochialism implies that a historian was unable to tap a wide variety of
sources, bias indicates that a historian selected the sources he would use and
ignored those which did not fit into his preconceived notion of past events.

In the former case, distortion of history, although regretable, is natural and
often hard to detect. In the latter case such distortion is unnatural,
reprehensible, and usually obvious to the discerning reader.

Few twentieth century events have escaped the effects of parochialism and
bias. Among the more important periods most severely affected by these
phenomena is that of the Second World War, in particular the war on the
Eastern Front — the Russo-German War. Diverging perspectives, parochialism,
and outright bias from all quarters have obscured or distorted the history of
the war and helped to produce long-standing misunderstandings and animosities.
In fact, it is safe to say that we are still far from achieving an objective
picture of the war, if in fact such a picture is achievable. The lack of
objectivity has left a legacy of misunderstanding concerning the political and
military events of the war. More important, since perceptions and policies of
the present are based, in part, upon a correct understanding of the past, many
of those perceptions and policies are founded on less than solid ground.

This paper focuses on only a narrow segment of World War II experiences
— experiences on the Eastern Front— within the context of the war in general.
In particular, it describes the U.S. perspective on the war and how events on
the Eastern Front fit into that overall view of war. Further it surveys the

L

forces (sources) that have shaped the current American perspective on that
important segment of World War II combat, specifically what Americans have
been taught or have read about the war. Finally the paper investigates the
accuracy of that perspective in light of existing source materials. Thus, in
essence, this is a critique of Eastern Front war historiography, a critique
which will hopefully broaden the perspective and understanding of American
and foreign readers and historians alike.

The American View of World War II

The American view of the war reflected the circumstances surrounding U.S.
involvement in the war as well as long term historical attitudes toward
European politics in general.* Despite strong public sentiment for assisting
beleaguered Western democracies, after war broke out in 1939 equally strong
neutralist sentiments blocked active U.S. participation in the war. As the
American public noted with growing concern the fall of France in 1940, the
expulsion of British forces from the continent at Dunkirk, and the struggle
for supremacy in the air over Great Britian, the U.S. government was able to
lend assistance to England short of actually joining the war. The German
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, while lamented as an extension of
the war, in some quarters was also viewed positively as it clearly diverted
German interest from Britian toward what most assumed would be a more
formidable opponent for the hitherto undefeated German war machine to deal
with. Additionally, Germany now faced a two-front war, and Anglo-Soviet war
cooperation against Germany was bound to ensue. In a sense, the German
decision to attack the Soviet Union strengthened the hand of American neutra-

*

I

i»’ll

lists who could point to the reduced need for U.S. intervention, an argument
quickly silenced by the extensive German advance in the East, which for a time
seemed to threaten the viability of the Soviet Union. The war itself in the
East was a shadowy affair signified by maps of the Soviet Union overlaid by
large arrows and clouds of black representing advancing Nazi forces. Little
detail of the conflict was available, setting a pattern which would endure
during the future years of war.

Only the brash Japanese surprise attack on U.S. facilities at Pearl
Harbor overcame this initial American reluctance to become actively involved
in war. This act unleashed American's emotions to an extent that earlier
American lukewarm commitment to the survival of the western democracies was
converted almost overnight into a broad American commitment to rid the world
of the menace posed by the Berlin-Tokyo axis. While early in the war the U.S.
government's principal concern was for assisting in the defeat of Nazi
Germany, the very fact that the Japanese surprise attack had catalyzed
American war sentiments led to ever increasing U.S. attention to the war in
the Pacific, a war which soon dominated U.S. newspaper headlines.

The combination of the U.S. government's focus on defeating Germany
“first" and the reality of fending off Japanese advances in the Pacific set
the tone for the U.S. perspective on the war and focused as well the attention
of the U.S. press and public on those two themes. Hence U.S. military
strategy involved the attaining of footholds on the European continent as a
means for achieving the ultimate destruction of Germany while the realities of
war in the Pacific and the overwhelming public sentiment to crush the nation
which had provoked the hostilities in the first place drew American forces
inexorably across the Pacific. The competing aims of America's two-front war,
in the end, diluted the government's efforts to first deal with Nazi Germany

and perhaps attenuated the achievement of victory in Europe. At a minimum, it
made the establishment of a "second front" in Europe a more formidable task
and led to the series of Allied operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy,
preceded by a sobering test of Allied capabilities to land directly in France,
conducted at Dieppe in August 1942. Military planners and the general public
alike were transfixed by foreign locales such as Tobruk, El Alamein, Oran,
Kasserine, Palermo, Salerno, and Anzio where America's military strategy
unfolded.

Driven by popular demand and the inertia of ongoing operations, America's
war in the Pacific in the summer of 1942 changed in nature from a defensive
one to an offensive one complete with alternative strategies for the defeat of
Japan. The names Guadacanal, Midway, New Guinea, and a host of hitherto
obscure islands dominated U.S. awareness — governmental and public alike.

It is axiomatic that where one’s forces operate, one's attention follows;
and where one's father, husband, or son fights and possibly dies, dominates a
families thoughts. Human ties usually dwarf geopolitical considerations, and
the piece of the mosaic of war with which a government or a public is involved
naturally becomes the dominant piece. The remainder of that mosaic, for most
remains a shadowy context of one's own struggle recognized as important only
by the most perceptive of observers.

Thus, America's perspective on war remained riveted to the path
undertaken by American forces In Europe and across the Pacific. To the
earlier place names of combat were added the names Normandy, Falaise, Metz,
and Aachen in Europe and Iwo Jima, the Philippines, and Okinawa in the
Pacific. As U.S. military efforts increased in scope; and as Axis power
diminished, the impact of those operations on the American public's memory
increased. Throughout this process the war elsewhere, the real global context

for American military operations, remained cloudy and obscure, the obscurity
reinforced by a lack of specific information as to what was occurring, in
particular at the public level.

The war on the Eastern Front, however unfairly, was a part of this
shadowy context. It is clear Americans knew in general about the war in the
East. They knew it was a massive struggle with vast implications for the
success of Allied strategy in the West. The names Leningrad, Moscow, Stalin¬
grad, and Kursk were familiar ones, and Americans could appreciate the impact
of Soviet victories at each location. But that was perhaps of the sum of
American understanding. Certainly, there was little in the American military
experience to condition Americans to conceive of operations as large as those
occurring in the East, and what is not experienced cannot be fully appreci¬
ated. Hence, the tendency of Americans (and others) to equate Stalingrad with
El Alamein and Kursk with Anzio. The comparison in terms of result (victory)
masked the issue of the contrasting scale and scope of these operations. As
the issue of the second front became a focal point of dispute among the
wartime allies, this context plus the real allied difficulties in effecting
such a landing made the Allied decision to open such a front in France in 1944
reasonable and understandable to the American public.*

During the last year of war the American public's (and government's)
attention was captured by the successful Normandy operation and the ensuing
breathtaking advance across France. Likewise, the German counterstroke in the
Bulge and the 1945 Allied advance into Germany dominated American public
awareness. Concurrent and massively successful Soviet operations in
Belorussia, Rumania, East Prussia, Poland, and Hungary were noted as part of a

^despite efforts by the Communist Parties of the United States and Great
Britian to publicize the Soviet role in war.

continuous, slow, but inexorable Soviet advance toward Germany. As before,

details of the Soviet operations were lacking, hence they tended to recede

into the background as a adjunct to successful Allied operations in the West

and in the Pacific as well. In a sense, America's attentions were focused on

the two great oceans and operations adjacent to them. The struggle in

continental Europe remained remote, geographically and psychologically. The

same tendency helped to relegate to obscurity Soviet participation in the

2

final stages of the war with Japan (the Manchurian operation).

Thus the war on the Eastern Front was acknowledged but never fully appre¬
ciated in wartime by the bulk of Allied public opinion. Initially the war
served the function of distracting German military attentions from England
eastward. Later the Red Army locked the German Army in a struggle which
enabled the other Allies to reestablish themselves on continental Europe.
Ultimately, the Red Army joined in the final victory assault on the German
Reich. The American public appreciated the role played by the Soviet people;
and, in fact, genuine feelings of warmth resulted. Americans, likewise,
seemed to understand the suffering involved in such a struggle. Yet, despite
these feelings, the details of those operations in the East remained obscure;
and, hence, a full realization of their importance was lacking. This tendency
persisted into the postwar years when it combined with other factors to create
a sort of mythology surrounding the events of the war In the East.

Postwar American Perspective on Eastern Front Operations

If American wartime Impressions of combat on the Eastern Front were vague
and imprecise, there was some improvement in that picture during the first
decade and a half after war ended. However, during that period a new tendency

emerged chat colored almost all future works describing events on the Eastern
Front. That tendency was to view operations in the East through German eyes
and virtually only German eyes. From 1945 to 1958 essentially all works
written in English or translated into English about events on the Eastern
Front were written by German authors, many of whom were veterans of combat in
the East, works moreover, based solely on German sources.

This German period of war historiography embraced two genre of works.

The first included memoirs written during those years when it was both
necessary and sensible to dissociate oneself from Hitler or Hitler's policies.
Justifiable or not, the writers of these memoirs did just that and essentially
laid blame on Hitler for most strategic, operational, and often tactical
failures. Thus, an apologetic Cone permeated these works. Officers who
shared in the success of Hitler's armies refused to shoulder responsibility
for the failures of the same armies. Only further research will judge the
correctness of their views.

The first of the postwar memoirs to appear in English was the by now

3

classic work, Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian. Guderian's work, which casts
considerable light on strategic and operational decisions while Guderian was a
panzer group commander in 1941 and later when he became Chief of Staff in
1944, set the tone for future treatment by German generals of Hitler's
leadership. Guderian laid at Hitler's feet principal responsibility for all
failures of the German Array and for the dismantling of the German General
Staff. The German General Staff was portrayed as both used and abused by
Hitler throughout the war. Guderian's message was best conveyed by the
chapter heading he chose for the section of the Polish War of 1939 which read,
"The Beginning of the Disaster." As in most subsequent works, Guderian
Included little Soviet operational data.

One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von

4

Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published in English in 1956. Mellenthin’s work,
an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of
Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler's adverse influence affected
tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic ap¬
proach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout
the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the
nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been
incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet military capabili¬
ties. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is
tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing
unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra¬
tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the
value of human life.^ As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's experi¬
ences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 aid
reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

Mellenthin's work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended
to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context.
Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's
classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations along the Chir River
after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example
of the weaknesses of his book.^ In it he describes the brilliant operations
of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units
which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On
7-8 December 1942, 1 1th Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at
State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th
Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes

Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a
context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th
Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet
forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged
Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably
because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly
continuous operation since 19 November and was understrength and worn down
when it began its march across the Chir. ^

Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin' s work, many of which result

Q

from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.

Of equal importance to Mellenthin's work, but written from a higher level

9

perspective, was the memoir of Eric von Manstein entitled Lost Victories. An
important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level of war,
Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944 at the strategic and
operational level. Manstein's criticism of Hitler reflected active disputes
which ultimately led to Manstein's dismissal as Army Group South commander.
Manstein's account of operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are
faceless, and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by archi¬
val materials of Fremde Heeres Ost (Foreign Armies East), Gehlen's organiza¬
tions, and of the OKH (the Army High Command).^ Again Soviet superiorities
are overstated.

These three basic memoirs dominated historiography of World War II in the
1950 's and continue to be treated as authoritative works today even as unex¬
ploited archival materials challenge an increasing number of facts cited in
the three works. Other works appeared in English during this period but were
generally concerned with individual battles or operations.^ Whether coinci-

iVi

dental or not, most of these unfavorable accounts of Soviet corabat performance
appealed to an American audience conditioned by the Cold War years. Notably,
few German commanders of the later war years, a period so unpleasant for
German fortunes, wrote memoirs; and the works of those who did (for example.
General Heinrici) still remain as untranslated manuscripts in the archives.

The second genre of postwar works included the written monographs based
upon debriefings of and studies by German participants in operations on the
Eastern Front. For several years after war's end the Historical Division of
USEUCOM supervised a project to collect the war experiences of these veterans
relating to all wartime fronts. Literally hundreds of manuscripts were
assembled on all types of operations. All were written from memory without
benefit of archival material. The Department of the Army published the best
of these short monographs in a DA pamphlet series in the late forties and
early fifties.

These pamphlets were of mixed quality. All were written from the German
perspective, and none identified Soviet units involved in the operations.

Some were very good, and some were very inaccurate. All require collation
with actual archival materials. All are still in use and are considered to be
as a valuable guide to Soviet operational tendencies. A few examples should
suffice to describe the care that must be employed when using these sources.

In 1950 a DA Pamphlet appeared assessing Allied airborne operations.

The distinguished group of German officers who wrote the pamphlet were
directed by Major General Hellmuth Reinhardt. The pamphlet critiqued German
and Allied airborne experiences. In Its chapter on Allied airborne landings
in World War II was a subsection entitled, "Reflections on the Absence of
Russian Air Landings," which began with the following statement:

It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not

attempt any large-scale airborne operations. . . its wartime-
operations were confined to a commitment of small units. . .

for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had

12

no direct tactical or strategic effect.

The study went on to mention a rumored air drop along the Dnepr in 1943 but
could provide few details of the drop.

A little over a year later Reinhardt discovered his error and put toget¬
her another manuscript describing the extensive airborne operations the
Soviets conducted within the context of the Moscow counteroffensive and adding

details to his description of the abortive Soviet Dnepr airborne drop in
13

1943. Recently the Office of the Chief of Military History republished the

original pamphlet describing the lack of Russian airborne activity.

Reinhardt's revised manuscript remains unpublished.

A DA pamphlet entitled German Defensive Tactics against Russian Break-

14

throughs contained similar errors. In a chapter describing a delaying
action conducted between 5-24 August 1943 the authors mistakenly stated that
German forces abandoned the city of Khar'kov on 18 August when, in fact, the
correct date was 23 August.^ Such errors intermixed with accurate date cast
serious doubt on the validity of these works as a whole. Despite these
errors, most the pamphlets have been reprinted; and they remain one of the
basic sources of data about the Red Army. Moreover, they provided impressions
of the characteristics of the Russian soldier which have become an integral
part of our current stereotype of the Soviet soldier.

One of the principal deficiencies of all genres of German postwar
accounts of fighting on the Eastern Front written during the 1950's was the
almost total absence of Soviet operational data. The forces German army

-12-

groups, armies, corps, and divisions engaged appeared as faceless masses, a
monolith of field grey manpower supported by seemingly endless ranks of
artillery and, by the end of the war, solid columns of armor. The faceless¬
ness of these Soviet masses, lacking distinguishable units and any individu¬
ally concerning unit mission or function, reinforced the impression conveyed
in these German works that Soviet masses, inflexibly employed in unimaginative
fashion, simply ground down German power and finally inundated the more
capable and artfully controlled German forces. The Soviet steamroller plod
into eastern Europe leaving in its wake endless ranks of dead and wounded.

That psychological image of the Soviets portrayed in German works has
persisted ever since. Moreover, this panorama of operations against a
faceless foe clouds the issue of correlation of forces and enables the writers
to claim almost constant overwhelming enemy force superiority, whether or not
it really existed. All of these memoirs and pamphlets appeared before German
archival materials were available, hence they were written without benefit of
the rich archival data on Soviet forces and operational methods found in these
wartime archives.

In the 1960's reputable trained historians began producing accounts of
action on the Eastern Front. These works were better than the earlier ones
but still lacked balance. They were based primarily on German sources but did
contain some material on the Soviets obtained from German archival sources.
Some were written by individuals who spent considerable time in the Soviet

Union during the war.

Alexander Werth drew upon his experiences in the wartime Soviet Union to
produce Russia at War and a number of shorter works. ^ Although these
writings contained little operational data they did present the Soviet
perspective as they focused on the suffering and hardship endured by the
Russian people and on the resulting bravery as they overcame those conditions.

Alan Clark’s survey account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa,
contained raoife operational detail.^ However, it still lacked any solid body
of Soviet data. Moreover Clark displayed a tendency others would adopt — that
is to cover the first two years of war in detail but simply skim over events
during the last two years of war. In fact, of the 506 page book, over 400
pages concern the earlier period. This reflected an often expressed judgment
that there was little reason to study operations late in the war because the
machinations of Hitler so perverted the ability of German commanders to
conduct normal reasonable operations.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History made a commendable effort to

correct this imbalance by publishing Earl Zlemke's work entitled Stalingrad to
1 8

Berlin. This work, given the available source material, was a sound and
scholarly one. Zierake surveyed operations from November 1942 to the close of
war, generally from a strategic and high level operational perspective. While
relying on German sources, he based his research on German archival materials
and did include material from the, by now, emerging Soviet accounts of opera¬
tions. In so doing Ziemke expanded the American view of the war in the East
and began to dispell some of the more serious errors found in earlier German

accounts .

Zierake and others who followed him with writings on the Eastern Front
were helped immeasurable by Soviet historians work on the war-— work which
began in the late 1950's and accelerated in the 1960's. Those new works,
about which I will have more to say later, although of mixed quality, added a
new but essential dimension to historiography of the war. Most good histor¬
ians took cognizance of them in their work. By the 1970 's enough of these
works existed to provide a more balanced vision of the war.

In the early seventies Paul Carell, a German author writing under a pen

name, finished publication of a two volume study of Eastern Front operations

1 9

entitled Hitler Moves East and Scorched Earth. These works, written in
appealing journalistic style, contained more German operational detail and
tapped numerous accounts by individual German officers and soldiers who served
in tactical units. Although Carell's works were heavily German in their per¬
spective, they did contain an Increased amount of Soviet materials. Their
lively narrative form has made them influential works among the reading
public.

In a more scholarly vein. Col. Albert Seaton published two works, The

Russo-German War and The Battle of Moscow which projected ZIemke's work down

20

to the tactical level. By exploiting the official records of particular
German divisions Seaton added a new dimension to the descriptions of war at
the tactical level. Like Carell, Seaton tempered his German perspective some¬
what by using data from a limited number of Soviet sources.

The works of John Erickson have been the most influential ones to appear
since 1960. They have broken the stranglehold which the German perspective
had over Eastern Front historiography and have integrated into that historio¬
graphy a comprehensive description of the Soviet perspective on the war, par-

ticularly at the strategic and operational levels. His first work, the Soviet

High Command, for the first time shed light on the events of the summer of

21

1941. His subsequent two books, The Road to Stalingrad and The Road to

Berlin, recounted in considerable detail the course of war from June 1941 to

22

May 1945. The principal value of these works derives from the fact that
they distill information from literally thousands of Soviet works on the war
and create from that information a detailed, sometimes frenetic, account of
operations in the East. The overwhelming impact of the narrative on the
reader reflects the overwhelming scale and scope of war in the East.

Erickson's works critically assess the Soviet sources and reject those
that conflict with the most influential and accurate German records. The
magnitude of Erickson's research efforts precluded his checking on the
accuracy of every tactical detail found in Soviet accounts. Therefore, in
some instances, Erickson's details do conflict with reputable German accounts.
In addition, Erickson has accepted Soviet data concerning correlation of
forces which, in some instances, have been inflated, in particular regarding
German strength. Dispute these minor faults Erickson's effort to produce a
Soviet view of the war has accomplished the major feat of providing readers
with more balanced sources upon which to reach judgments concerning combat in
the East. Unfortunately the size and complexity of Erickson's works precludes
their appeal to a broad readership among the general public. Future
historians will have the task of integrating Erickson's view with those of the
host of other memoir writers and historians who wrote from the German
perspective.

Across the span of time from 1945 to the present, despite the work of
Erickson and a few others, the German view of war on the Eastern Front has
predominated. In part, this has resulted from a natural American parochi-

alism that tended to discount or ignore the importance of operations in the
East in the overall scheme of war. During the earlier postwar period the
German view prevailed by default. Numerous German accounts appeared, and
nothing in the way of Soviet material appeared to contradict them. By the
1960's, when Soviet accounts began to appear, the German view was firmly
entrenched. Moreover, the cold war atmosphere often prompted out of hand
rejection of the Soviet version of war. The German view, sometimes accurate,
often apologetic or accusative, and usually anti-Soviet, prevailed. As a
result, this view was incorporated into high school and college textbooks and
into the curriculum of U.S. military educational institutions. Most impor¬
tant, is provided a context within which to judge the contemporary Soviet
military. Only today is that view increasingly being challenged. Those
challenges are made possible by intensified Soviet publication efforts,
efforts that are slowly raising from obscurity details of Soviet operations on
the Eastern Front. These Soviet publication efforts, however, must overcome
serious barriers if they are to produce a view which can complement the German
perspective and produce a more balanced picture of war on the Eastern Front.

Soviet Sources: Perceptions and Reality

American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front have been shaped in
part by the course of Soviet historiography on the war. As stated earlier,
the Soviet reticence of address operations in detail during the immediate
postwar period left the field open for the German perspective, which in turn
predominated. Soviet efforts to set the record straight began in the late
I950's and continue today but have only partially tempered that German view.

Three principal barriers exist to block, or inhibit Soviet historical
efforts from influencing the American perspective. The barriers are, in
sequence: a lack of knowledge in the West concerning Soviet historical work,
the language barrier, and a basic distrust of the credibility of Soviet works.
The first two of these barriers are mechanical and can be easily addressed.

The third is more fundamental and more difficult to overcome.

Most Americans and Westerners are soon unaware of the scope of Soviet
historical efforts. They assume that the Soviet reticence to talk openly of
operational matters, characteristic of the period prior to 1958, continues
today. In fact, Soviet historical efforts have increased geometrically, and
Western audiences need to be educated to that fact. The fact that most of
these works ^re only in Russian inhibits that education. To remedy this
problem more Americans need to learn Russian (an unlikely prospect), or more
Soviet works will have to appear in English. Increased research by American
military historians using Soviet sources can also contribute to overcoming
this first barrier. The second barrier is a physical one regarding language.
If a source cannot be read, it makes little difference whether or not it is
available or, for that matter, credible. The only remedy to this barrier Is
more extensive translation and a publicizing of Soviet sources by their use in
more detailed historical monographs..

The third barrier, involving credibility, is more fundamental. It is, In
part, an outgrowth of ideological differences which naturally breed suspicion
on the part of both parties. It is also a produce of the course of Soviet war
historiography which itself is subject to criticism, depending on the period
during which the Soviet sources appeared.

-18-

■»Vll

Svif

iM

cM

In Che immediate postwar years, from 1945 to 1958 few Soviet military

23

accounts appeared about operations on the Eastern Front. Those that dj.d
appear were highly politicized and did not contain the sort of operational
detail which would make them attractive to either the casual reader or the
military scholar. Indeed, they were of little use to the military
studenc(Soviet or foreign), which may, in part, explain their paucity of
accurate detail.

Beginning in 1958 more accurate and useful accounts began appearing in a

number of forms. From its inception, Soviet Military History Journal has

sought to publish high quality articles on relevant military experiences at

24

all levels of war. This journal after 1958 immediately began investigation
of a series of burning questions, perhaps the most important of which was an
investigation of the nature of the initial period of war, (Nfachalnv period
voini), a topic noticeably ignored in earlier Soviet work. Military History
Journal has since focused on practical, realistic questions within a theore¬
tical context. It has personified the Soviet penchant for viewing military
affairs as a continuum within which individual issues must be viewed in a
historical context.

In 1958 the first Soviet general history of the war appeared, Platonov'

25

History the Second World War. This volume, for the first time, addressed
Soviet wartime failures which had been almost totally overlooked in earlier
years. For example, it openly referred to the abortive Soviet offensive at
Khar'kov in May 1942, a subject hitherto apparently too sensitive to talk
about. Platonov offered few real details of these failures but did break the
ice regarding a candid reference to failures in general which represented a
quantum leap in the candor of Soviet sources.

Ac the same time Soviet authors resumed a wartime tendency to teach by

use of combat experience. Kolganov's Development of Tactics of the Soviet

Army in the Great Patriotic War, published in 1958, contained a thorough

26

review of wartime tactics by combat example. This didactic work sought to
harness experience in the service of education and did so by drawing upon a
wealth of tactical detail, some of it relating to failure as well as success.
Kolganov's accounts, although fragmentary, seemed to affirm a Soviet belief
that one learns from failure as well as success; and, if one is to be educated
correctly (scientifically), details must be as accurate as possible in both
cases.

After 1958 a flow of memoir literature, unit histories, and operational

accounts began that has continued, and, in fact, intensified, to the present.

The Soviets have sought to capture the recollections of wartime military

leaders at every level of staff and command. These include valuable memoirs

of individuals at the STAVKA level (Shtemenko, Vasilevsky, Zhukov), front

level (Rokossovsky , Konev, Meretskov, Yerememko, Bagramyan), array level

(Moskalenko, Chuikov, Krylov, Batov, Galitsky, Grechko, Katukov, Lelyushenko,

27

Rotmistrov), and at the corps level and below. Soviet military historians

have logged the experiences of many Soviet units including armies, tank

armies, corps (tank, mechanized, and rifle), divisions, and even regiments and

28

separate brigades, although with a few notable exceptions. Memoir
literature has also extended into the realm of the supporting services (air,
navel, engineer, signal, etc).

Over time some excellent operational studies have appeared focusing on

major operations (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia), on lesser operations

(Novgorod-Luga , Eastern Pomerania, Donbas), and on specific sectors in larger
29

operations. Written by academic historians (Samsonov) or military histor-

!

ians (Zhilin, Galitsky, Sidorenko) many of these are first rate works con¬
taining massive amounts of, for the most part, accurate detail. Building upon
the memoirs, unit histories, and operational studies were valuable functional
works which distilled the sum total of those experiences. These studies
included general military histories and histories of operational art (Semenov,
Strokov, Bagramyan, Krupchenko), operational and tactical studies based on
combat experiences (Radzievsky, Kurochkin), studies on the use of armored and
mechanized forces (Rotmistrov, Babadzhanyan, Radzievsky, Losik), treatices on

operational art and tactics (Sidorenko, Savkin, Reznichenko) , and studies on

30

numerous other topics relating to combat support.

New general histories of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, have

appeared since 1960. A six volume history of the war in the East provided a

more candid view of political issues of the war than earlier war histories and

31

added some operational details hitherto not revealed. Its size, however,

limited coverage of lower level operational or tactical detail. An eleven

volume history of World War II was politically less candid but did add another

32

measure of detail to accounts at the strategic and operational levels.

Thus it is apparent that massive amounts of Soviet military data concern¬
ing operations on the Eastern Front do exist. Moreover, the sura total of that
information, as Erickson has demonstrated, forms an impressive picture of
operations in the East. On balance much of that information is accurate as
well.

There are however, some problems with these sources, just as is the case
with German sources, that must be critiqued if one wishes to prevent creating

a Soviet bias similar to the earlier German bias I described.

First, Soviet works tend to contain a high political or idealogical
content. In essence, they are intended to indoctrinate as well as teach. In
theory, of coarse, war, in all its detail, is a continuum of the political
and, hence, ideological context. Thus the political content is understand¬
able, if not obligatory. A critical reader must recognize what is political
and what is not and must not allow his judgment of the one to affect his
judgment of the other. He must also realize that many of these works, espe¬
cially the briefer and more popular ones, are written to inspire. Thus,
interspersed with operational and tactical fact are inevitable examples of
individual or unit self sacrifice and heroism (which may or may not be accur¬
ate). The tendency of the Western reader is to note the often romanticized
single act and reject also the account of action surrounding it.

Soviet military works written before 1958 were highly politicized and

33

focused heavily on the positive role of Stalin in every aspect of war.
Correspondingly, operational and tactical detail was lacking. After 1958 the
political content of military works diminished as did emphasis on the "cult of
personality," leaving more room for increasing amounts of operational and
tactical detail. Since that time the political content of military works has
varied depending on the nature of the work and the audience it intended to
address. Hence the briefer the article and the less sophisticated the audi¬
ence, the higher was the political content. First-rate operational and
tactical studies limited political coverage to the role of the party structure
in planning and conducting operations.

Soviet military writers also have tended to accentuate the positive, to
cover successful operations In more detail than unsuccessful ones. Thus,
until recently, little was written about the border battles of June-Julv 1941,
about the Khar'kov and Kerch operations in May 1942, about the Donbas and

Khar'kov operations of February-March 1943, and about the wanning stages of

34

many successful operations. Likewise, few unit histories have appeared of

35

armies which operated on secondary directions in the period 1943-1945.

The Soviets in the early sixties began noting these failures, saying, for
example, that in May 1942 Soviet forces launched an offensive at Khar'kov but
the offensive was unsuccessful. This is certainly cor-ect but not very help¬
ful to one who wishes to learn from failures. As time has passed more
material has appeared concerning these failures (for example, a chapter from

Moskalenko's Na yugozapadnom napravlenii (On the southwestern direction) pro-

35

vides considerably more detail on the Khar'kov disaster.

A similar pattern emerged in Soviet treatment of their own airborne

experiences, which were notable for their lack of success. There were few

references to those failures prior to 1964. Yet by 1976 most of the

unpleasant details were public, although romanticized a bit.

Very naturally Soviet interpretation of operations have often differed

sharply from the German. In fact, over time differences in interpretation

have appeared within the circle of Soviet military writers. In the case of

memoir material this takes the form of debates over the rationable for and th

3 6

outcome of operations — debates conducted by competing memoirs.

One is struck in Soviet accounts by the accuracy of facts, principally

concerning unit, place, and time. Soviet sources in this regard invariable

match up with the operational and tactical maps found in German (or Japanese)

unit archives. It is apparent in some cases that Soviet military historians

have made extensive use of such German archival materials in preparing their
37

own studies.

Less unanimity exists over what actually occurred at a given

place and at a given time. Just as is the case in some German accounts, towns

abandoned by the enemy were "taken after heavy fighting," and units driven

38

back in disarray simply "withdrew to new positions."

Especially striking are those frequent cases where low level Soviet

accounts precisely match German accounts. In a history of the 203rd Rifle

Division the author described the operations of that unit in the frenetic

post-Stalingrad days of December 1942 when Soviet forces pressed German units

southward from the Don and Chir Rivers toward the rail line running from

39

Tatsinskaya to Morozovsk. The 203rd Rifle Division was ordered to advance
by forced march about 50 kilometers, cross the Bystraya River, and reach an
encircled Soviet armored force at Tatsinskaya. The author described the
action as the worn division, by now running short of ammunition, reached the
ridge line north of the Bystraya. There it confronted an advancing force of
German armor and infantry dispatched north of the river. The German force,
estimated at 15 tanks, struck two regiments of the 203rd Rifle Division which,
because of ammunition shortages, were forced to withdraw several kilometers.
Just as he was fearing for the fate of his division the Soviet divisional
commander contacted a nearby antitank company which provided the division
supporting fire. Miraculously the German force broke contact and withdrew
south of the river. This Soviet account did not mention the designation of
the German unit.

In a casual interview with a former lieutenant from 6th Panzer Division,
which fought along the Bystraya River in late December 1942, I asked the

lieutenant about his unit's operations on the day of the events described by

40

the Soviet account. He responded that 6th Panzer dispatched an armored

kampfgruppen north of the Bystraya with about 15 tanks and supporting infantry
in order to disrupt the Soviet advance to and across the river. He was in the

task force. The force struck a Soviet unit, elements of which withdrew after
desultory firing. The German unit pursued a short distance until it came
under fire from an undetected Soviet artillery unit, fire which stripped the
infantry away from the tanks. Fearing the loss of critical armored assets
left unprotected by infantry, the Germans withdrew south of the river.

This isolated incident is often typical of the complementary nature of
Soviet and German (and Japanese) accounts regarding unit, place, and time. It
also vividly underscores the necessity, or at least the desirability of having
both sides of the story.

A major discrepancy between Soviet and German sources concerns the number

of forces at the disposal of each side. Examination of both sources and

German archival material indicates several tendencies. First, Soviet accounts

of their own strength seem to be accurate and reflect the numbers cited in

41

documentation of Fremde Heeres Ost. Conversely, Soviet sources tend to

exaggerate the strength of German forces they opposed. Moreover, Soviet

exaggeration of German strength regarding guns and armor Is even more severe

than in regards to manpower. In part, this results from the Soviet practice

of counting German allies, auxiliary forces, and home guards (Volksturm)

units. But even counting these forces, Soviet estimates of German strength,

42

when compared with the strengths shown by OKH records, are too high. Just
as the Germans exaggerate when they cite routine Soviet manpower
preponderances of between 8:1 and 17:1, so also do Soviet sources exaggerate
Soviet-German strength ratios as being less than 3:1 and often 2:1 up to 1945
when higher ratios were both justified and recognized by Soviet sources. For
example, the Japanese armored strength of about 1500 tanks cited in Soviet

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lIUMUnx

works on Manchuria exceeded tenfold the actual Japanese armored strength,
which, in addition, was comprised of armored vehicles scarcely deserving of
the name (and apparently, for that same reason, never used in the operation).

Soviet sources also adversely affect their own credibility with regards

to wartime casualty figures. The earlier practice of totally ignoring

casualties has begun to erode, but one must look long and hard to find any

loss figures, indicating that this is still obviously a delicate question for

Soviet writers. Gross figures do exist for large scale operations (Berlin,

S.E. Europe, Manchuria), and one can infer casualties from reading divisional

histories which sometimes give percentages of unit fill before and after

43

operations and company strengths. Comprehensive coverage of this issue,
however, does not exist; and the reader is left to reach his own conclusions
(One of which is that the Soviet author has something to hide).

Thus, in addition to the general American (and Western) ignorance of the
existence of Soviet source material and the presence of an imposing language
barrier, Americans question the credibility of Soviet sources. While this
questioning was once valid, it is increasingly less valid as time passes.
Soviet sources have some inherent weaknesses; but these weaknesses, over time,
have been diminishing. Unfortunately, the American perception of Soviet
sources remains negative; and, hence, the American perception of the Eastern
Front has changed very little. Only time, more widespread publication of
candid operational materials (some of it in English), and more extensive use
of those materials by American military historians will alter those percep¬
tions. That alteration will likely be painfully slow.

-26-

Conclusions: The Reconciliation of Myths and Realities

The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American percep¬
tions off the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet
source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on
the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated
as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Array combat per¬
formance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of
historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace
between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments
are as follows:

— Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German
operational alms.

—Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation
possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.

— Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets
continually ignored human losses.

— Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb.
However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly
dismal.

--Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every
level was inflexible and unimaginative.

— Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather
than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever

possible

— The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units,
and attacked along straight axes.

— Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse
might have ensured.

— Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army exper¬
tise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War
I "stab in the back" legend).

— The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great
suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in parti¬
cular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fight¬
ing, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic
in the face of uncertainty.

A majority of Americans probably accept these judgments as realities .

In doing so they display a warped impression of the war which belittles the
role played by the Red Array. As a consequence, they have a lower than justi¬
fied appreciation for the Red Army as a fighting force, a tendency which
extends, as well, to the postwar Soviet Array. Until the American public (and
historians) perception of Soviet source material changes, this overall percep¬
tion of the war in the East and the Soviet (Red) Army is likely to persist.

Close examination of Soviet sources as well as German archival materials

cast many of these judgments into the realm of myth. Recent work done on

Eastern Front operations has begun to surface the required evidence to

44

challenge those judgments. Continued work on the part of American
historians, additional work by Soviet historians, joint work by both parties,
and more extensive efforts to make public Soviet archival materials is
necessary for that challenging process to bear fruit.

It is clear that no really objective or more complete picture of
operations on the Eastern Front is possible without extensive use of Soviet
source material. Thus definitive accounts of operations in the East have yet to
be written. How definitive they will ultimately be depends in large part on
the future candor and scope of Soviet historical efforts.

In the interim it is the task of American historians, drawing upon all
sources, Soviet and German alike, to challenge those judgments and mispercep¬
tions which are a produce of past historical work. It is clear that the
American (Western) perspective regarding war on the Eastern Front needs broad¬
ening, in the more superficial public context and in the realm of more serious
historical study. Scholarly cooperation among Soviet and American historians,
research exchange programs involving both parties, and expanded conferences to
share the fruits of historical research would further this end and foster more
widespread understanding on both sides.

•,* \ 7

-29-

NOTES

1. This view is drawn from a review of newspaper coverage of the war by the
New York Times but, more important, by local newspapers as well. It is also
based on ten year's experience in teaching and listening to a generation of
postwar students at the U.S. Military Academy, The U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

2. Americans also believed, and still believe, the use of the atomic bomb in
early August 1945 rendered Soviet operations in Manchuria superfluous.

3. H. Guderian, Panzer header, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957) First edition
published in 1952.

4. F. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor In
the Second World War, (Norman, Okl: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972)

First edition published in 1956.

5. Ibid., 185-186, 209, 233-234, 292-304. Mellenthin did, however, note the
tremendous improvements in Soviet armored capability during wartime and noted,
"The extraordinary development of the Russian tank arm deserves the very care¬
ful attention of students of war."

6. Ibid., 175-135.

7. One of the few Soviet accounts of action along the Chir River is found in
K. K. Rokossovsky, ed., Velikaya pobeda na Volge (The Great Victory on the
Volga), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1960), 307-309. An indicator of reduced 1st Tank
Corps strength is apparent from German situation maps, see Lagenkarte XXXXVII1
Pz-Kps. 7.12.42 through 12.12.42.

8. Particularly in Mellenthin's brief account of operations in the Donbas in
February 1943. The map and text provide incorrect positions for two divisions

of It SS Panzer Corps.

9

E. von Manstein, Lost Victories, (Chicago, Ill: Henry Regnery, 1958)

10. Manstein cites force ratios as being 8:1 in favor of the Soviets opposite
Army Groups Don and B and 4:1 against Army Groups Center and North. Fremde
Heeres Ost documents dated 1 April 1943 give the ratios of just over 2:1
against Army Groups South and A and 3:2 against Army Groups Center and North.
The overall German estimate of Soviet superiority on that date was just under
2:1. See Fremde Heeres Ost Kraftegegenuberstellung: Stand 1.3.43.

11. For example, H. Schroter, Stalingrad, (London: Michael Joseph, 1958).

12. DA Pamphlet No. 20-232, Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal,
(Department of the Army, October 1951), 36.

13. H. Reinhardt, "Russian Airborne Operations, "Foreign Military Studies MS
No. P-116, Reproduced by the Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953.

14. DA Pamphlet No. 20-233, German Defensive Tactics Against Russian Break¬
throughs, (Department of the Army, October 1951).

15. Ibid., 64-70. This article treated German defensive operations between
Belgorod and Khar'kov from 5-23 August 1943 and subsequent delaying actions in
late August and early September 1943 as a continuous delay, when, in fact, the
Germans attempted to hold the Khar'kov area until forced to withdraw by heavy
Russian attacks east and west of the city.

16. A. Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945, (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1964).

17. A. Clark, Barbarossa : The Russo-German Conflict 1941-1945, (London:
Hutchinson, 1965).

18. E. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East,
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army,
1968).

19. P. Carell, Hitler Moves East and Scorched Earth, (New York: Little,
Brown, 1965, 1966).

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t

)

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i

F

!

20. A. Seaton, The Russo-German Mar 1941-1945, (London: Arthur Barker,
1971); A. Seaton, The Battle of Moscow, (New York: Playboy Press, 1980),
original edition 1971.

21. J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Political-Military History
1918-1941, (London: St. Martins, 1962).

22. J. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany,
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1984), First edition in 1975; J. Erickson, The
Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany,
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1983).

23. General histories of the war included I. V. Anisimov, G. V. Kuz'min,
Velikaya Otechestvennaya volna Sovetskovo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg (The Great
Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1952), and
F. D. Vorob'ev, V. M. Kravtsov, Pobedy Sovetskykh vooruzhennykh sll v Vellkoi
Otechestvennoi voine 1941-1945 (The Victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the
Great Patriotic War), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1953). All were highly political,
focused on the role of Stalin, and lacking in any useful military details. A
notable exception was one monograph, V. P. Morozov, Zapadnee Voronezha (West
of Voronezh), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1956), a work whose factual content and
candor set the tone for subsequent studies published after 1958. During this
apparently sterile period in terms of military details, substantial articles
did appear in some Soviet military journals, in particular In the Journal of
Armored and Mechanized Forces (Zhurnal Bronetankovykh i mekhanlzirovannykh
voisk) , and in Military Thought (Voennaya Mysl'), but both of these journals
were unavailable to the American reading public and historians as well.

24. Military History Journal (Voenno-lstorlcheskll Zhurnal) is the official

organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense

25. S. P. Platonav, ed., Vtoraya mirovaya voina 1939-1945 gg (Moskva:
Voenizdat, 1958).

26. K. S. Kolganov, ed., Pazvitle taktiki Sovetskoi Armil v gody Vellkol
Otechestvennol volny (1941—1945 gg) (The development of Soviet Army tactics
during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1958). A
companion book related the experiences of armored forces.

27. Among the front and army commanders who did not write memoirs, either
because they died during wartime or in the immediate postwar period or because
of other reasons were Vatutin (Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian Front commander who
died in early 1944),, Chemyakovsky (3rd Belorussian Front commander who died
in February 1945), Bogdanov (2d Guards Tank Army), Rybalko (3rd Guards Tank
Army), and Kravchenko (6th Guards Tank Array). Rotmistrov (5th Guards Tank
Army) wrote half of his memoirs before death interrupted his work.

28. Among which are most of the armies which operated on secondary direc¬
tions, in particular in 1944 and 1945.

29. These include operational studies by a single author or by a "collective"
of authors or anthologies made up of made up of articles written by distin¬
guished participants in the operation from all command and staff levels.

30. All of these highly technical studies have been periodically updated to
include the results of subsequent research. Most are used in the Soviet mili¬
tary education system.

31. Istoriya Velikol Otechestvennol volny Sovetskovo Soyuza 1941-1945
(History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945) in 6
volumes (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1960-1965).

32. Istoriya vtorol mlrovol volny 1939-1945 (History of the Second World War
1939-1945) in 12 volumes (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1973-1982).

-33-

33. Stalin himself contributed to the military writings in the form of a
short general history of the war. In the same period he established his claim
as military theorist by enunciating his "permanent operating factors" which he
claimed governed the conduct and outcome of war.

34. Recently Military History Journal has published several articles on
mechanized forces in the border battles of 1941. Moskalenko was the first to
cast light on details of the Khar'kov debacle in his work Na yugozapadnom
napravlenii (On the southwest direction), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1972). A. G.
Yershov revealed details of the Donbas operation in his work Osvobozdenle
Donbassa (The liberation of the Donbas), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1973), but
cloaked the material on the Soviet February-March 1943 defeat in details con¬
cerning the Soviet victories in the same area later in the year. Characteris¬
tically bits and pieces of details about these operations are found in indivi¬
dual unit histories. It is left to the historian to fit the pieces together
into a coherent whole.

35. Such as 3d, 3d Guards, 27th, 28th, 3lst, 40th-49th, 52d, 53d, 60th, 70th,
and other armies.

36. For example, the debate between Zhukov and Chuikov over the feasibility
of Soviet forces advancing on Berlin in February 1945 at the end of the
Vistula-Oder operation and the manner of Zhurkov's conduct of the penetration
phase of the Berlin operation.

37. In Soviet studies involving airborne operations west of Moscow in early
1942 Soviet accounts contain German order of battle data unobtainable in
German secondary accounts. See I. I. Lisov, Desantniki-vozduzhnye desantv
(Airland¬
ing troops — airlandings) , (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1968).

-34-

38. For example, a German account of the seizure of Barvenkovo in the Donbas
in February 1943 talks of the Germans using a ruse to frighten Soviet
defenders from the city without a fight. In actuality, Soviet accounts and
German records indicate it took several days of heavy fighting to expel Soviet
forces from the city. Conversely, what the Soviets described as "heavy street
fighting" to secure Khar'kov in August 1943 turned out to be lighter action
against German stragglers left behind as the Germans deliberately abandoned
the city (albeit against the orders of the German High Command).

39. This action is described in G. S. Zdanovich, Idem v nastuplenie (On the
offensive), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1980), 47-53.

40. Interview with Oberst (Formerly Lt.) Helmut Ritgen at the U.S. Army War
College in March 1984. Both accounts of the action are confirmed by
Lagenkarte XXXXVIII pz. kps. 29.12.42; Kriegs-Tagebuch, Gen. Kdo, XXXXVIII
Panzer Korps, 28.12.42, 29.12.42.

41. For example, Fremde Heeres Ost (Foreign Armies East) assessed Soviet
strength on the Eastern Front on l November 1944 to be 5.2 million men.

Soviet sources claim the strength of their operating forces on the Eastern
Front was 6 million men.

42. OKH (Army High Command) strength reports show roughly 2. 1 million German
soldiers on the Eastern Front on 1 November 1944 plus about 200,000 men In
Allied forces. The Soviets claim they were opposed by 3.1 million men. On
January 1945 Soviet sources cite German armor strength at 4,000 tanks and
self-propelled guns. German records show about 3,500 tanks and self-propelled
guns. The Soviets credit the Germans with 28,500 guns and mortars while
German records show a figure of 5,700. Similar discrepancies between Soviet
and German data exist throughout the war.

43. For example, the Soviets claim they suffered 32,000 killed and wounded in
Manchuria and have cited precise figures for some other operations or percent¬
ages of losses in particular units during specific operations. Similar
figures are usually unobtainable for operations occurring earlier <n the war.
One can reach gross conclusions about losses from unit histories such as that
of the 203rd Rifle Division which, by the end of the Middle Don operation, had
losses which reduced the strength of rifle companies to 10-15 men each. In
this case full TOE strength would have been 76 men, but most divisions began
operations with from 40-60 men per company. Obviously, in this Instance
losses were high.

44. This includes extensive analysis of operations done within the context of
the U.S. Army War College Art of War symposium which has completed a three
year analysis of selected Eastern Front operations from late 1942 through
1945. New Ultra information and material from the Fremde Heeres Ost archives
cast new light on the actual intelligence picture upon which Hitler and the
Army High Command based their decisions. New German works by such historians
as H. Boog, G. Ueberscharl and W. Wette are also challenging traditional views
concerning the rationale for German strategic and operational decisions. Most
of these works however, are not available in English.

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